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INTRODUCTION

In May 2017, WannaCry malware spread across the globe by exploiting a known vulnerability in Windows called EternalBlue.1
WannaCry encrypted files on infected Windows systems.2 The malware impacted schools, hospitals, and businesses in over 150 countries,3 including the British National Health System, which spent
nearly $100 million to fix its systems.4 Two months earlier, Windows had released patches for the EternalBlue vulnerability.5 Had
the patches been installed, the malware would not have impacted

1. Ionut Arghire, NSA’s EternalBlue Exploit Fully Ported to Metasploit, SEC. WK. (May
16, 2017), https://www.securityweek.com/nsas-eternalblue-exploit-fully-ported-metasploit.
2. Russell Goldman, What We Know and Don’t Know About the International Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/international-cyberattack-ransomware.html.
3. Id.
4. Danny Palmer, This Is How Much the WannaCry Ransomware Attack Cost the NHS,
ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2018, 5:59 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/this-is-how-much-thewannacry-ransomware-attack-cost-the-nhs/.
5. Security Update for Microsoft Windows SMB Server (4013389), MICROSOFT,
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2017/ms17-010 (Oct. 11,
2017).
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the Windows systems.6 In June 2017, another piece of malware,
known as NotPetya, exploited the same Windows vulnerability to
cause even more damage.7 NotPetya irreversibly encrypted computers in a way that made it impossible to recover the computer or
the data on it.8 NotPetya caused large, multinational companies to
go offline for weeks and caused billions in damages.9 It has been
called the “most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history.”10
Not only did the malware impact operations at affected companies, it also had legal impacts. In June 2017, Nuance, a speech
recognition software vendor, was a victim of the NotPetya attack,
which cost the company more than $90 million.11 Nuance was also
the defendant in two lawsuits brought by two of Nuance’s customers.12 The lawsuits alleged Nuance failed to use reasonable care in
its information security practices.13 Specifically, one of the customers alleged that although in March 2017 the customer had installed
the Windows patch for EternalBlue on its Windows systems, Nuance did not.14 The customer alleged that because Nuance’s network had administrator-level credentials to the customer’s network, the malware entered the customer’s network and caused
nearly $11 million in damage.15
Each year software and hardware vendors release thousands of
updates to patch vulnerabilities in their software.16 Over the past
6. Customer Guidance for WannaCrypt Attacks, MICROSOFT SEC. RESPONSE CTR. (May
12, 2017), https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/.
7. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Wannacry, Ransomware, and the
Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503, 531–32 (2019).
8. Id. at 532.
9. Press Briefing, The White House, Statement from the Press Sec’y (Feb. 15, 2018)
(archived at https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-se
cretary-25/).
10. Id.
11. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 23 (Feb. 9, 2018).
12. Heritage Valley Health Sys., Inc. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d 175
(W.D. Pa. 2020); Princeton Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1:19-00265,
2020 WL 1698363 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 7, 2020).
13. Heritage Valley Health Sys., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d at 18889; Princeton Cmty. Hosp.
Ass’n, Inc., 2020 WL 1698363, at *1.
14. Complaint at ¶¶ 25–26, Princeton Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 2020 WL 1698363 (S.D.
W. Va. Apr. 11, 2019) (No. 19-C-59). This lawsuit was jointly dismissed by the parties after
the court denied Nuance’s motion to dismiss. See Joint Stipulation & Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice, Princeton Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 2020 WL 1698363 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 11,
2020) (No. 19-C-59). The other lawsuit was dismissed because the court found that Nuance
did not owe a duty to its customer beyond the obligations in the contract between the parties.
Heritage Valley Health Sys., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d at 187.
15. Complaint, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 37, 56.
16. Is Software More Vulnerable Today?, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR CYBERSECURITY (Mar.
12, 2018), https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/is-software-more-vulnerabletoday.
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twenty years, the number of vulnerabilities has largely increased
each year.17 Companies that rely on the software and hardware to
run their businesses must sift through the deluge of notifications
and determine which patch should be prioritized in order to prevent
a hacker from exploiting an unpatched vulnerability and using it to
get inside the company network.18 Vendors typically assign a score,
using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), to each
vulnerability to indicate the likelihood and impact of exploitation.19
Some vulnerabilities are considered important enough that the
United States Department of Homeland Security orders all federal
agencies to implement a patch within a particular time period.20 In
fact, in May 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order on
Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical
Infrastructure which found that “[k]nown but unmitigated vulnerabilities are among the highest cybersecurity risks faced by executive departments and agencies.”21 These “[k]nown vulnerabilities
include[d] using operating systems or hardware beyond the vendor’s support lifecycle” and “declining to implement a vendor’s security patch.”22
Many data breaches that occur each year are due to unpatched
vulnerabilities.23 Reports vary about how many data breaches are
due to known unpatched vulnerabilities. One study reported sixty
percent of the breaches could have occurred because a patch was
available for a known vulnerability but not applied.24 Another report found that one in three breaches are caused by unpatched vulnerabilities.25
17. National Vulnerability Database: Statistics Results, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/statistics (last visited Mar. 8, 2021). The number of vulnerabilities dramatically increased beginning in 2017. See Rob Lemos, The State of Vulnerability Reports: What the CVE Surge Means, TECHBEACON, https://techbeacon.com/security/state-vulnerability-reports-what-cve-surge-means (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
18. See Jason Bloomberg, To Patch or Not to Patch? Surprisingly, That Is the Question,
FORBES (Apr. 16, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbloomberg/
2018/04/16/to-patch-or-not-to-patch-surprisingly-that-is-the-question/?sh=4997f33d58fe.
19. Common Vulnerability Scoring System SIG, FIRST, https://www.first.org/cvss/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2021).
20. See, e.g., CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., EMERGENCY DIRECTIVE 20-04, MITIGATE NETLOGON ELEVATION OF
PRIVILEGE VULNERABILITY FROM AUGUST 2020 PATCH TUESDAY (2020).
21. Exec. Order No. 13,800, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,391, 22,391 (May 11, 2017).
22. Id.
23. Taylor Armerding, Patch Now or Pay Later: Report, FORBES (June 6, 2019, 9:37 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/taylorarmerding/2019/06/06/report-if-you-dont-patch-you-willpay/?sh=2e3fe0693acd.
24. PONEMON INST. LLC, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF GAPS IN VULNERABILITY
RESPONSE 3 (2020).
25. Steve Ranger, Cybersecurity: One in Three Breaches Are Caused by Unpatched Vulnerabilities, ZDNET (June 4, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/google-
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Although the process of prioritizing and implementing patches is
technical and typically not the responsibility of an organization’s
legal department, unpatched software is a legal risk for organizations. With the evolution of cybersecurity regulation and litigation,
legal liability relating to vulnerability and patch management is no
longer theoretical.26 Because software vendors typically notify their
customers about vulnerabilities in their software and the availability of updates,27 regulators may take the position that companies
that use the software are generally on notice of the vulnerabilities.
Due to the increase in the number of disclosed vulnerabilities and
the increased general acceptance of security standards, regulators
have been paying greater attention to whether companies are
patching known software vulnerabilities. Because company lawyers may not be sufficiently technically knowledgeable to understand the IT department’s approach to vulnerability and patch
management, it can be a blind spot for the legal department. Conversely, the IT department may not understand the legal implications of the work they do in this arena. This article attempts to
bridge that gap.
This article begins with an overview, in non-technical terms, of
the tools generally available and processes implemented for vulnerability management and patch management. Section II identifies
some of the evolving security standards that regulators and plaintiffs may rely on to show that companies are legally required to have
vulnerability management and patch management. Section III
identifies U.S. legal implications of vulnerability management and
patch management and factors that a court and regulators may consider.

amp/article/cybersecurity-one-in-three-breaches-are-caused-by-unpatched-vulnerabilities/.
The other end of the spectrum is reporting that the root cause of only two percent of breaches
was missing patches. See SARA BODDY & RAY POMPON, THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORT:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM A DECADE OF DATA BREACHES (2017), https://www.f5.com/content/
dam/f5/downloads/F5_Labs_Lessons_Learned_from_a_Decade_of_Data_Breaches_rev.pdf.
This report points out that some phishing cases are only successful if the end user’s machine
is not patched properly. Id. at 36 (“For phishing cases that rely on users opening a malicious
file (which can then exploit a vulnerability on the system), patch, update, and patch again!”).
26. See generally STEWART BAKER & MAURY SHENK, A PATCH IN TIME SAVES NINE:
LIABILITY RISKS FOR UNPATCHED SOFTWARE, STEPTOE & JOHNSON (Oct. 2003),
https://www.steptoe.com/publications/274a.pdf.
27. Cristian Florian, Security Patching Trends for Major Software Vendors, TECHTALK
(Mar. 13, 2012), https://techtalk.gfi.com/security-patching-trends-for-major-software-vendors/.
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OVERVIEW OF VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT AND PATCH
MANAGEMENT

Most computer users are familiar with software updates.
Whether it is an update for the operating system on a Windows
computer or an iPhone, the update fixes bugs or vulnerabilities in
the software.28 In a business setting, the employees who use a laptop to carry out their duties, also called “end users,” are generally
unaware of the various software on the company’s network and the
updates. The responsibility for identifying the software that needs
to be updated, prioritizing the updates, and implementing the updates usually falls to the information technology and information
security teams.29 The technical terms for these processes are vulnerability management and patch management.30 A non-technical
overview of the tools used for these processes are explained below.
A.

Vulnerability Management

The processes by which vulnerabilities are identified are varied.
Every day, computer security researchers31 examine software for
problems in the computer code that cause the software to do something it is not intended to do.32 These weaknesses, or vulnerabilities, in the software could be exploited by an attacker to perform an
unauthorized action within a computer system.33 Ideally, before
publicly disclosing the vulnerability, the computer security researcher notifies the software vendor about the vulnerability and
gives the vendor an opportunity to create a “patch” that fixes the
vulnerability.34 Once the vulnerability has been publicly disclosed,
28. See Understanding Patches and Software Updates, CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-006 (Nov. 19, 2019).
29. Armerding, supra note 23.
30. This article addresses vulnerabilities in software and the application of patches to
mitigate those vulnerabilities. Others use the term “vulnerability management” to broadly
refer to a variety of weaknesses including mismanagement of IT hardware and software or
even physical security issues. See, e.g., Sean Atkinson, Cybersecurity Tech Basics: Vulnerability Management: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS (2018), https://www.cisecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Cybersecurity-Tech-Basics-Vulnerability-Management-Overview.
pdf.
31. Software companies employ security researchers and others to identify vulnerabilities in their software. For example, these researchers may examine the code within malware
in circulation in order to determine whether malware can be used to exploit a previously
unknown vulnerability within software. Independent security researchers who work for security firms unaffiliated with software companies similarly investigate and identify these
vulnerabilities.
32. Atkinson, supra note 30, at 1.
33. Id.
34. Vulnerability disclosure best practices are discussed in Allen D. Householder et al.,
The CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.:
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the Mitre Corporation (MITRE), a federally funded research center,
assigns the vulnerability a unique Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE),35 and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes information about the vulnerability in the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD).36 Within an organization,
the IT team or information security team is responsible for reviewing the software on the organization’s network to identify, classify,
remediate, and mitigate the software vulnerabilities.37 The process
of “identifying, classifying, remediating, and mitigating vulnerabilities” is called vulnerability management.38
There are several different ways an IT team can become aware of
a newly identified software vulnerability. One typical way is
through email notifications directly from the software vendor.39
Typically, the IT team signs up for these notifications based on the
software the business is running.40 Another typical way is through
the use of software—vulnerability scanners—to “scan” systems and
networks for hosts using outdated or unsupported software.41 A
“host” includes servers, desktop personal computers, or personal
electronic devices.42 The vulnerability scanners generate a report
that identifies the total number of identified hosts and vulnerabilities, including a risk level for each vulnerability.43 In addition to
identifying software vulnerabilities that require patching, the results from the vulnerability scanners can identify vulnerabilities
SOFTWARE ENG’G INST. (Aug. 2017), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/SpecialReport/2017_003_001_503340.pdf.
35. About CVE, COMMON VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURES, https://cve.mitre.org/about/index.html (Mar. 29, 2021).
36. National Vulnerability Database: Statistics Results, supra note 17.
37. See generally Tom Palmaers, Implementing a Vulnerability Management Process,
GLOB. INFO. ASSURANCE CERTIFICATION (Mar. 23, 2013), https://www.giac.org/paper/
gsec/32851/implementing-vulnerability-management-process/112555.
38. PARK FOREMAN, VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT 1 (2d ed. 2019).
39. See, e.g., Adobe Security Notifications Registration: Security Notification Service,
ADOBE, https://www.adobe.com/subscription/adbeSecurityNotifications.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2021).
40. See, e.g., id.
41. Common vulnerability scanning software vendors include Tenable, Qualys, Rapid7,
and Nexpose. See, e.g., Close Your Cyber-Exposure Gap, TENABLE, https://www.tenable.com/products (last visited Mar. 10, 2021); Nexpose Vulnerability Scanner, RAPID7,
https://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2021); Vulnerability Management That’s Accurate and Scales!, QUALYS, https://www.qualys.com/lp/vulnerability-management/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
42. Miles Tracy et al., Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers: Recommendations of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. app. B,
at B-1 (Sept. 2007), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication80044ver2.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Warlock, Vulnerability Assessment with Nexpose, INFOSEC RES. (Dec. 27,
2013), https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/vulnerability-assessment-nexpose/.
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due to configuration problems or outdated certificates.44 While
these are vulnerabilities that the IT and information security teams
should address, they are separate from vulnerabilities that require
patching.
Traditionally, vulnerability scanners were “agentless,” but agentbased scanning is also now available.45 In addition to the decision
about whether to use agentless scanning, agent-based scanning, or
both, the IT and information security teams must decide how often
to scan and what to scan.46 Agentless scanning and agent-based
scanning offer different features for identifying vulnerabilities
which are explained below.
1.

Agentless Scanning

Agentless scanning relies on one or more servers to perform network scanning of each host. The scan collects information about the
host, including what versions of different software the host is running.47 Agentless scanning can be “credentialed” or “non-credentialed.”48 Credentialed scanning requires that the IT team enter an
administrator username and password into the scanning application.49 The application then has greater access to the host to return
more accurate scanning results. In a given network, there is likely
more than one set of administrator credentials. The process of ensuring the scanning application has the correct administrator credentials can be burdensome. The analogies for the difference between “credentialed” or “non-credentialed” are many, including the
difference between an x-ray and an MRI or a home inspection conducted from the sidewalk versus going inside the home.50
The scope of agentless scanning is limited to hosts on the local
network. This means laptops and mobile devices not on the network during the scan are omitted from the results.51 Other
44. Atkinson, supra note 30.
45. See Murugiah Souppaya & Karen Scarfone, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management
Technologies, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 8 (July 2013), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov
/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r3.pdf.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. This is also referred to as “authenticated” or “unauthenticated” scanning. See Lucian
Constantin, What Are Vulnerability Scanners and How Do They Work?, CSO ONLINE
(Apr. 10, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3537230/what-are-vulnerability
-scanners-and-how-do-they-work.html.
49. Id. Because the administrator password can be intercepted, some IT teams use keys
or certificates for credentialed scans.
50. See, e.g., Lascon, Vulnerability Management: You’re Doing It Wrong, YOUTUBE (Jan.
21, 2019), https://youtu.be/yUZ_YFSNQQE (referencing material at time stamp 19:30).
51. Souppaya & Scarfone, supra note 45, at 9.
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limitations of agentless scanning include other security controls
that may inadvertently block the scanning and considerations due
to the scanning consuming excessive amounts of bandwidth.52
2.

Agent-Based

Unlike agentless scanning, agent-based scanning requires the installation of software, an “agent,” on each host. The agent has administrator privileges, which ensures every scan is “credentialed.”
The agent sends the information back to a server that collects information about the host including what versions of software the
host is running. Unlike agentless scanning, agent-based scanning
is not dependent on the host being on the corporate network.
B.

Patch Management

The scale of correctly and safely implementing a patch across an
entire organization can be challenging. Prior to releasing a patch,
software vendors test the patch to ensure the software continues to
properly function. However, it is not possible for the software vendor to test how every application or third-party software will react
to the patch. This task is left to IT departments. Typically, the IT
department tests the patch in a test environment to see whether it
causes other applications to perform in unexpected ways, including
causing other applications to crash or run slowly. After testing the
patched software, the IT department will decide to install the patch
or not. In some cases, companies have found it prudent to delay the
installation of a patch while awaiting any report of security issues
related to the patch itself. If the IT department installs the patch,
the final step in the process is verifying the installation. This resource intensive process of “identifying, acquiring, installing, and
verifying patches for products and systems” is called patch management.53
Because the process is resource intensive, IT departments must
make decisions about how to optimally patch the vulnerabilities
that pose the greatest risk to the organization. Typically, the process is formalized in a patch management process or procedure and
may include a service-level agreement (SLA) between the IT and
information security teams. The process, procedure, and SLA can
vary in terms of the level of detail it contains, including the length
of time available for the IT department to patch vulnerabilities
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2.
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based on severity rating, e.g., critical vulnerabilities must be
patched within one week.54
Organizations typically consider the following characteristics
when making decisions about which vulnerabilities to prioritize.
1.

Severity Based on CVSS

The CVSS is a de facto international standard for measuring the
severity of a vulnerability.55 The CVSS score uses eight characteristics of a vulnerability to produce a numeric score between zero and
ten, which corresponds to a severity rating: low (0.13.9), medium
(4.06.9), high (7.08.9), and critical (9.010.0).56 As explained
above, the severity of the EternalBlue vulnerabilities used in the
NotPetya and WannaCry malware was “high.” One of the EternalBlue vulnerabilities was CVE-2017-0143. The numeric score for
the vulnerability was 8.1. As an example of the CVSS rating, the
eight characteristics for the vulnerability and a brief explanation of
the applicable characteristic are as follows:
x Attack Vector—Network. The vulnerability can be executed remotely.
x Attack Complexity—High. A successful attack cannot be
accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest
in some measurable amount of effort in preparation before
a successful attack can be expected.
x Privileges Required—None. The attacker does not require
any prior access to settings or files to carry out the attack.
x User Interaction—None. The vulnerable system can be
exploited without any interaction by a user. For example,
it does not require a user to open a file or click on something.
x Scope—Unchanged. The exploited vulnerability can only
affect systems managed by the same authority.
x Confidentiality—High. The attacker is able to divulge all
the resources within the impacted system.
x Integrity—High. The attacker is able to modify all files
protected by the impacted system.

54. When an SLA identifies required due dates for different vulnerabilities based on severity, the SLA due dates may have to account for situations where a CVE does not have a
patch immediately available.
55. Jay Jacobs et al., Improving Vulnerability Remediation Through Better Exploit Prediction, J. CYBERSECURITY, July 17, 2020, at 4.
56. National Vulnerability Database: Vulnerability Metrics, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH., https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).

Summer 2021

Patch Management

279

x

Availability—High. The attacker is able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted system.
One common approach to patch management is to prioritize
patches based on the CVSS score.57 For internet-accessible systems, the Department of Homeland Security requires federal agencies remediate critical vulnerabilities within fifteen calendar days
of initial detection and high vulnerabilities within thirty calendar
days of initial detection.58 Similarly, the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) contains a requirement that no
medium, high, or critical vulnerabilities be present on internet-accessible systems within the payment card environment, absent
compensating controls.59
Even if an organization limits its patch management to critical
and high vulnerabilities, the number of vulnerabilities can be overwhelming. Between 2017 and 2020, there were more than 4,000
critical and high vulnerabilities reported by US-CERT each year.60
2.

Availability and Use of an Exploit

A different approach to patch management focuses on whether
attackers have exploited the vulnerability or whether an exploit is
available. A vulnerability is only a weakness in particular software.61 In order for an attacker to exploit the vulnerability, the
attacker needs a written exploit—software code that takes advantage of the vulnerability. Of the thousands of vulnerabilities
identified in software every year, written exploits are available for
only a small percentage.62 An even smaller number of exploits are
57. Jacobs et al., supra note 55, at 6.
58. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
BINDING OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 19-02, VULNERABILITY REMEDIATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
INTERNET-ACCESSIBLE SYSTEMS (2019) (available at https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/bod19-02.pdf).
59. PAYMENT CARD INDUS. DATA SEC. STANDARD, REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 99 (May 2018) (Requirement 11.2.2–11.2.3).
60. National Vulnerability Database: CVSS Severity Distribution over Time,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., https://nvd.nist.gov/general/visualizations/vulnerabilityvisualizations/cvss-severity-distribution-over-time (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). The chart relies on CVSS V2 scores, instead of the current CVSS V3. See id. Under CVSS V2, a numeric
value of seven or greater was a high severity vulnerability. Id. CVSS V3 added an additional
severity level of critical for numeric values of nine or greater. Id.
61. Gary Stoneburner et al., Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 15 (July 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/nist800-30.pdf.
62. MEHRAN BOZORGI ET AL., BEYOND HEURISTICS: LEARNING TO CLASSIFY
VULNERABILITIES AND PREDICT EXPLOITS (2010), https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~saul/papers/
kdd10_exploit.pdf (estimating written exploits are available for 10–15% of vulnerabilities);
Jacobs et al., supra note 55, at 5 (estimating written exploits are available for approximately
12% of vulnerabilities).
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actually used to target corporate networks.63 One approach suggested by security researchers is to prioritize patching based on
whether a published exploit is available.64
3.

Characteristics of the System

A third consideration for determining which systems to patch is
the characteristics of the system. Important characteristics include
whether or not the system is internet facing and how critical the
system is to the business. A system that is internet facing is more
vulnerable to exploitation because an attacker does not need to be
on the same network to exploit the vulnerability. The criticality of
the system to the business is important because critical systems
should be prioritized for patching.
C.

Other Compensating Controls

Sometimes patching a piece of software is not practical because
it would be too disruptive to the organization. Some older systems
may be “fragile” and critical to the business. Because the system is
fragile, patching the system may break the critical application or
service. Other operating systems may not be able to be patched
because they have applications that do not work with newer versions of the operating system. This can occur when a version of
Microsoft Windows reaches its end of life. For example, Microsoft
stopped supporting Windows 7 in January 2020, and it will end support for Windows 10 in May 2021.65
When this occurs, the IT and information security teams will typically rely on other techniques, or “compensating controls,” to reduce the risk that the vulnerability will be exploited. The other
techniques can include increasing logging and monitoring on the
unpatched systems or reducing accessibility to the system through

63. CARL SABOTTKE ET AL., VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA:
EXPLOITING TWITTER FOR PREDICTING REAL-WORLD EXPLOITS (2015), https://www.usenix
.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity15/sec15-paper-sabottke.pdf (observing exploits
in the wild for 1.3% of vulnerabilities); Jacobs et al., supra note 55, at 2 (observing exploits
in the wild for 5.5% of vulnerabilities).
64. Jacobs et al., supra note 55, at 10 (“For example, if a firm addresses vulnerabilities
that have a proof-of-concept code published in Exploit DB, our model will achieve a comparable level of coverage, ‘but at one-quarter the level of effort.’”) (emphasis added).
65. Products Ending Support in 2021, MICROSOFT, https://docs.microsoft.com/enus/lifecycle/end-of-support/end-of-support-2021 (Mar. 11, 2021); Support for Windows 7 Has
Ended, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/end-of-window
s-7-support (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
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an “allow list.”66 An allow list is a list of IP addresses that are permitted to access the unpatched system.
III.

OVERVIEW OF SECURITY STANDARDS RELATING TO
VULNERABILITY AND PATCH MANAGEMENT

Like many other technical areas of responsibility, non-profit organizations and government agencies provide technical standards
to guide information security professionals. The standards address
a wide range of security concepts and establish “best practices” for
different aspects of a comprehensive information security program.
All of the leading security standards now reference vulnerability
management and patch management. The leading security standards include the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls,
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27000 standards, and PCI-DSS. These standards have been endorsed by the
California Attorney General’s Office and the Ohio Data Protection
Act.67 An overview of the leading security standards and their references to vulnerability management and patch management are
provided below.
A.

NIST

NIST is an agency of the United States Department of Commerce
that functions as the “lead national laboratory for providing the
measurements, calibrations, and quality assurance techniques
which underpin United States commerce, technological progress,
improved product reliability and manufacturing processes, and
public safety.”68 In 2014, Congress amended the National Institute
of Standards and Technology Act and directed NIST to develop a
“voluntary, consensus-based, industry-led set of standards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, procedures, and processes to
66. Katie Stewart, Establish and Maintain Whitelists (Part 5 of 7: Mitigating Risks of
Unsupported Operating Systems), CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV.: SOFTWARE ENG’G INST. (Oct. 25,
2017), https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/insider-threat/2017/10/establish-and-maintain-whitelists
-part-5-of-7-mitigating-risks-of-unsupported-operating-systems.html. The term whitelist is
also known as “allow list.” Emma W, Terminology: It’s Not Black and White, NAT’L CYBER
SEC. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/terminology-its-not-black-andwhite. Many organizations, including the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre,
have stopped using the term “whitelist” and use “allow list” instead. Id.
67. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH REPORT
2012–2015, at 30 (Feb. 2016) (available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/dbr/
2016-data-breach-report.pdf); see also Ohio Data Protection Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1354.01–1354.05.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1).
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cost-effectively reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure.”69 The
same year, NIST published version 1.0 of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework.70 In April 2018, NIST published version 1.1, the current version of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST Framework).71 The NIST Framework identifies five core “functions” for
cybersecurity and matches each function with a subcategory and an
informative reference for existing standards and guidelines.72 The
following subcategories notably identify and address vulnerability
management and patch management as part of these best practices:
x DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed.
x ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented.
Another relevant NIST publication is NIST’s flagship information security publication, Special Publication 800-53, Security
and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations,
which provides a catalog of security and privacy controls for information systems and organizations.73 In this document, two controls
relevant to vulnerability management and patch management are
set forth: Control RA-5, Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning,
cites monitoring and scanning for vulnerabilities in the system at a
frequency defined by the organization,74 while Control SI-2, Flaw
Remediation, recommends that organizations test software updates
then install “security-relevant” software updates within an “organization-defined time period” after release of the update.75
B.

Center for Internet Security Controls

The Center for Internet Security (CIS) is a nonprofit organization
whose mission is “to make the connected world a safer place by developing, validating, and promoting timely best practice solutions
that help people, businesses, and governments protect themselves

69. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (2014).
70. See Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Version 1.0,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf.
71. See Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity: Version 1.1,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 16, 2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/
NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf.
72. Id. at 6–7.
73. See generally Joint Task Force, Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Sept. 2020), https://nvlpubs.
nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
74. Id. at 269.
75. Id. at 333.
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against pervasive cyber threats.”76 Similar to NIST, CIS has developed the “CIS Controls,” a set of twenty security controls.77 Among
the six priority controls, referred to as the “Basic CIS Controls,” is
CIS Control 3: “Continuous Vulnerability Management.”78 The subcontrols for CIS Control 3 address the specific requirements to implement the control:
x CIS Control 3.1: Run Automated Vulnerability Scanning
Tools
x CIS Control 3.2: Perform Authenticated Vulnerability
Scanning
x CIS Control 3.3: Protect Dedicated Assessment Accounts
x CIS Control 3.4: Deploy Automated Operating System
Patch Management Tools
x CIS Control 3.5: Deploy Automated Software Patch Management Tools
x CIS Control 3.6: Compare Back-to-back Vulnerability
Scans
x CIS Control 3.7: Utilize a Risk-rating Process
Additionally, CIS Control 18.8, relating to Application Software
Security, requires that organizations “[e]stablish a process to accept
and address reports of software vulnerabilities, including providing
a means for external entities to contact [the organization’s] security
group.”79
C.

ISO

The ISO is an international organization that publishes standards for different industries, including information security.80 The
ISO 27000 standards series, which are published jointly by the ISO
and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), is meant
to provide best practices for information security management.81
76. About Us, CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., https://www.cisecurity.org/about-us/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
77. CIS Controls Navigator, CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-implementation-groups/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
78. Continuous Vulnerability Management, CTR. FOR INTERNET SEC., https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/continuous-vulnerability-management/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
79. 18.8: Establish a Process to Accept and Address Reports of Software Vulnerabilities,
CONTROLS ASSESSMENT SPECIFICATION, https://controls-assessment-specification.readthe
docs.io/en/latest/control-18/control-18.8.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
80. See generally Standards, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso
.org/standards.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2021).
81. ISO/IEC 27001:2013(en), INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/
obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:27001:ed-2:v1:en (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). This version was reviewed
and confirmed in 2019. ISO/IEC 27001:2013, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION (Oct. 2013),
https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html.
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Organizations that adopt and implement ISO 27000 can hire thirdparty auditors to certify the company as compliant with different
standards that are part of the series. A common standard for certification is ISO 27001.82 The next standard in the series, ISO 27002,
provides a reference for organizations implementing ISO 27001.
One of the controls, or measures taken to reduce information security risks, identified in ISO 27002 is control A.12.6—Technical vulnerability management.83 This control requires that “[i]nformation
about technical vulnerabilities of information systems being used
should be obtained in a timely fashion, the organization’s exposure
to such vulnerabilities evaluated and appropriate measures taken
to address the associated risk.”84 A series of other steps and implementation guidance includes maintaining an accurate inventory of
assets on the network, identifying roles and responsibilities for
members of the organization who support vulnerability management, creating a timeline for the process, and analyzing the risks
for implementing a patch.
D.

PCI-DSS

The PCI-DSS is a standard promulgated by the payment card industry that applies to the various entities that process payment
cards—merchants, processors, service providers, and banks.85 First
released in 2004 and updated periodically, the standard sets a baseline of technical and operational requirements that the payment
card brands direct entities to follow. The current version requires
organizations to scan for internal and external security vulnerabilities and patch or mitigate them. In addition, PCI-DSS explicitly
requires the minimum frequency for scanning, the time in which
patches must be applied, and the risk rating score for patching:
x Requirement 6.1: Establish a process to identify security
vulnerabilities using reputable outside sources for security vulnerability information and assign a risk ranking
(for example as “high” “medium” or “low”) to newly discovered security vulnerabilities.
x Requirement 6.2: Ensure that all system components and
software are protected from known vulnerabilities by

82. ISO/IEC 27002:2013, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION (Oct. 2013), https://www.
iso.org/standard/54533.html.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. About Us, PAYMENT CARD INDUS. SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
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installing applicable vendor-supplied security patches.
Install critical security patches within one month of release.
Requirement 11.2: Run internal and external network
vulnerability scans at least quarterly and after any significant change in the network (such as new system component installations changes in network topology firewall
rule modifications product upgrades).
Requirement 11.2.1: Perform quarterly internal vulnerability scans. Address vulnerabilities and perform rescans
to verify all “high risk” vulnerabilities are resolved in accordance with the entity’s vulnerability ranking (per Requirement 6.1). Scans must be performed by qualified
personnel.
Requirement 11.2.2: Perform quarterly external vulnerability scans, via an Approved Scanning Vendor (ASV) approved by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards
Council (PCI SSC). Perform rescans as needed, until passing scans are achieved.
IV.

LEGAL RISKS

Following a data breach, the victim organization can face regulatory investigations and enforcement actions, as well as civil litigation, often in the form of class actions.86 The potential legal liability
depends on a variety of factors, including the data the attacker accesses or acquires and what the company did to protect itself and
its data. A review of regulatory enforcement actions and guidance,
as well as evolving case law, reveal that issues relating to vulnerability and patch management have been recognized as the basis for
liability.
A.

Regulators

A variety of state and federal regulators take the position that
they have jurisdiction to bring legal action against a company in
response to a breach. Specific industry regulators may have enforcement authority under statutes that apply to particular industries. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) (in the context of consumer protection) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (in the
86. This article does not address legal implications under contract law or foreign legal
requirements. Both should also be considered and may impose additional legal risks.
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context of financial institutions), the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (HHS OCR) enforces the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforces the Safeguards
Rule of Regulation S-P. Beginning with an enforcement action
against Guess? and through publications about information security,87 the FTC has indicated that effective vulnerability management and patch management are important considerations in its
determination of whether companies, including vendors, have “reasonable” information security practices. HHS OCR has similarly
indicated that it considers vulnerability management and vulnerability management to be important parts of an information security
program. The SEC has not brought an enforcement action for failure to implement vulnerability management and risk management,
but it has discussed the importance of them in publications.
1.

Federal Trade Commission

The FTC is an independent federal agency aimed at protecting
consumers and competition.88 Through enforcement, education,
and advocacy, it protects consumers from unfair and deceptive practices in vast sectors of the economy.89 The FTC brings a variety of
enforcement actions, addressing an array of issues. Relevant to information security are the FTC’s enforcement actions under both
the “deceptiveness” and “unfairness” prongs of Section 5 of the FTC
Act and the Safeguards Rule under the GLBA.90 In recent enforcement actions and in official publications, the FTC has demonstrated
a growing interest in vulnerability management and patch management.
a.

Enforcement Under the FTCA

Purporting to act under its authority to prevent “unfair” practices
in commerce, the FTC has brought enforcement actions against
companies for a failure to implement reasonable cybersecurity
measures. While the existence and scope of that jurisdiction continues to be debated, in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation,
87. Guess?, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 507, 511 (2003) (Complaint) (FTC alleged Guess? failed “to
implement reasonable and appropriate measures to secure and protect the databases that
support or connect to the website” by failing to “test or otherwise assess the website’s or the
application’s vulnerability to attacks . . . .”).
88. About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Dec.
28, 2020).
89. Id.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1314.5 (2002).
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the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the FTC’s authority to regulate cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of Title
15 U.S.C. Section 45(a).91 This decision has been criticized on a
number of grounds, including because the FTC failed to provide notice to companies about what constitutes “reasonable” information
security practices.92 In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation,
the Third Circuit held that fair notice is satisfied when a company
can reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as
falling within the meaning of the statute.93 The court observed that
the relevant inquiry under subsection 45(n) for unreasonableness is
a cost-benefit analysis that considers “the probability and expected
size of reasonably unavoidable harms to consumers given a certain
level of cybersecurity and the costs to consumers that would arise
from investment in stronger cybersecurity.”94
In the Wyndham case, the FTC alleged that hackers attacked the
Wyndham Corporation’s computer systems in three separate incidents in 2008 and 2009, stealing hundreds of thousands of consumers’ PII and leading to over $10 million in fraudulent charges.95 Following the attacks, the FTC filed suit in federal district court alleging Wyndham engaged in “unfair cybersecurity practices” and the
corporation “unreasonably and unnecessarily exposed consumers”
PII to attack.96 The FTC alleged Wyndham “permitt[ed] Wyndhambranded hotels ‘to connect insecure servers to [h]otels and [r]esorts’
networks, including servers using outdated operating systems that
could not receive security updates or patches to address known security vulnerabilities.’”97 This is one of many complaints by the
FTC that allege a company did not have “reasonable” information
security practices, in part, due to unpatched or unsupported software.
91. 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015). Relevant here, one of the charges against Wyndham, involved insufficient patch management on network connect computers. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J. 2014).
92. See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data
Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 719
(2013); see also Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security
Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 183 (2008).
See generally Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, When “Reasonable” Isn’t: The FTC’s
Standardless Data Security Standard, 15 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 67 (2019). See also LabMD,
Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (ruling FTC cease and desist order was
unenforceable due to vagueness of requirement of “reasonably designed data-security program”).
93. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 256.
94. Id. at 255.
95. Id. at 240.
96. Id.
97. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J. 2014).
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Although not directed at internal vulnerability management and
patch management programs, two FTC enforcement actions
against software and hardware vendors for their alleged failure to
provide proper software updates to their customers demonstrate
the FTC’s consideration of the importance of software updates. In
2011, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Oracle due in
part to software updates to Java, a programming language that Oracle had developed.98 The FTC alleged that Oracle knew that its
consumers were vulnerable to attack due to Java’s insufficient update process.99 The FTC cited internal Oracle documents stating
that the “Java update mechanism is not aggressive enough or
simply not working.”100 The FTC alleged when Java consumers updated the Java software, unbeknownst to the consumers, prior versions of the software remained on the consumers’ computers.101 The
FTC claimed that hackers exploited the flaw and accessed consumers’ data through the outdated Java versions.102 In the consent
agreement, the FTC ordered Oracle to improve the Java updating
process and conspicuously inform consumers of the versions of Java
installed on their devices.103
In 2016, the FTC brought a similar action against ASUSTeK
Computer, Inc. (ASUS) for its alleged failure to protect users of
ASUS’s routers from cyberattack.104 ASUS, a hardware manufacturer, developed software for its routers and was responsible for developing and distributing software updates to patch security vulnerabilities.105 Many of ASUS’s routers included features called
AiCloud and AiDisk, which allowed consumers to plug USB hard
drives directly into the routers to create an at-home “private personal cloud.”106 In 2014, hackers exploited vulnerabilities in
AiCloud and accessed over 12,900 consumers’ storage devices.107
The FTC alleged hackers accessed the users’ connected storage devices without credentials by bypassing the AiCloud login screen.108
Additionally, the FTC alleged the default settings on AiDisk made
98. Oracle Corp., No. 132-3115, 2015 WL 9412609, at *1 (F.T.C. Dec. 21, 2015) (Complaint).
99. Id.
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. at *6–7 (Order).
104. ASUSTeK Comput., Inc., No. 142-3156, 2016 WL 4128217, at *1 (F.T.C. July 18,
2016) (Complaint).
105. Id.
106. Id. at *2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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the storage devices accessible to anyone on the internet who had
the routers’ IP addresses.109 The FTC alleged that ASUS did not
notify consumers about available security updates.110 Moreover,
the tool that informed consumers of available security updates often
told consumers their software was up-to-date when, in fact, newer
software with “critical security updates” was available.111 The FTC
ordered ASUS to establish a comprehensive security program.112
Specifically, the FTC ordered ASUS to notify consumers about software updates and to refrain from making misleading statements
regarding whether consumers’ products were up-to-date.113
In recent consent decrees, the FTC has consistently ordered companies to implement patch management programs.114 In 2020, the
number of people who participated in Zoom meetings each day rose
from approximately 10 million to 300 million.115 Within this context, the FTC claimed Zoom undermined the security of its users by
engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices.116 According to
the FTC, Zoom had failed to maintain proper internal network security, despite touting its advanced security practices.117 Relevant
here, the FTC alleged Zoom was a year or more behind in patching
software in its commercial environment.118 As part of its settlement
with the FTC—in addition to discontinuing some of the practices
alleged in the complaint—Zoom must implement specific security
safeguards, including conducting vulnerability scans on at least a
quarterly basis and implementing policies and procedures to remediate critical or high vulnerabilities no later than thirty days after
detection.119
Zoom must hire a third party to conduct an

109. Id. at *3.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Id. at *6.
112. Id. at *13–15 (Order).
113. Id. at *14.
114. Andrew Smith, New and Improved FTC Data Security Orders: Better Guidance for
Companies, Better Protection for Consumers, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2020,
9:46 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/01/new-improved-ftcdata-security-orders-better-guidance (“We were also mindful of the 11th Circuit’s 2018
LabMD decision, which struck down an FTC data security order as unenforceably vague.
Based on this learning, in 2019 the FTC made significant improvements to its data security
orders.”).
115. Zoom Video Commc’ns, Inc., No. 192-3167, 2020 WL 6589815, at *2 (F.T.C. Nov. 9,
2020) (Complaint).
116. Id. at *2–3.
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id.
119. Zoom Video Commc’ns, Inc., No. 192-3167, 2020 WL 6589819, at *1–3 (F.T.C. Nov. 9,
2020) (Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment).
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independent assessment of the new safeguards once every other
year for twenty years.120
Moreover, in post-2018 cases, involving SkyMed, D-Link, and InfoTrax, the FTC ordered companies to implement security safeguards that include vulnerability testing.121 For example, it ordered InfoTrax to scan for vulnerabilities every four months.122
The consent agreement in Zoom and agreements in other recent
cases exemplify the FTC’s recent specific focus on ordering entities
to implement vulnerability management programs. The requirement to implement a vulnerability management program is more
specific than previous orders, which at times vaguely required companies to implement reasonable security programs “designed to protect the security . . . of personal information . . . .”123 The more recent orders are still broad and susceptible to a wide range of interpretations, and ultimately, companies face potential legal risk as
they try to navigate the logistical and practical challenges of prioritizing which out-of-date software to update.
b.

Enforcement Under the GLBA

While the FTC has brought enforcement actions for violation of
the GLBA Safeguards Rule, the complaints and consent orders have
not explicitly referenced vulnerability management and patch management. The Safeguards Rule, which implements section 501(b)
of the GLBA, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b), requires financial institutions develop a written information security program that contains “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information.”124 The Safeguards Rule identifies general requirements. Influenced by the
New York Department of Financial Services (NY DFS) Cybersecurity Requirements for Financial Services Companies, the FTC has
proposed a revised Safeguards Rule that contains more specific information security requirements.125 Although the proposed revision
does not explicitly reference vulnerability management and patch
management,
it
does
reference
periodic
vulnerability
120. Id. at *2–3.
121. Skymed Int’l, Inc., No. 192-3140, 2020 WL 7646326, at *4 (F.T.C. Dec. 16, 2020); FTC
v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00039-JD (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017) (Leagle); InfoTrax Sys.,
L.C., No. 162-3130, 2019 WL 6168270, at *3 (F.T.C. Nov. 12, 2019).
122. InfoTrax Sys., L.C., 2019 WL 6168270, at *3.
123. LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018).
124. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1 (2002).
125. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,158 (Apr. 4,
2019).
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assessments.126 Neither the proposed revisions nor the NY DFS
regulations define vulnerability assessments.
c.

FTC Publications

The FTC has issued a number of publications addressing what it
considers reasonable for vulnerability management and patch management. In the FTC brochure, Start with Security, the FTC explains the need for patch management programs stating:
[d]epending on the complexity of your network or software, you
may need to prioritize patches by severity; nonetheless, having
a reasonable process in place to update and patch third-party
software is an important step to reducing the risk of a compromise.127
In 2016, the FTC recommended that entities, as part of their general network security, regularly check with vendors and experts for
alerts about vulnerabilities and “implement policies for installing
vendor-approved patches to correct problems.”128 Then in 2020, the
FTC reiterated its requirement for patch management programs,
explaining that its recent consent decrees had ordered companies
to implement such programs.129
Together, the orders and publication suggest that the FTC believes that patch management programs are fundamental to reasonable cybersecurity but also that the agency understands that it
is not a one-size-fits-all process. As explained in Section II, the adequacy of vulnerability management and patch management remains a question of degree. For many companies, it is cost prohibitive to patch every out-of-date software on every system. Instead,
companies prioritize based on risk calculations. Thus, vulnerability
management and patch management are unlike some other areas
of information security, which can be binary, e.g., customer files are
encrypted or they are not, default passwords must be changed or
they are not. The exceptions to this general observation are when
a company has internal policies or makes statements that a third
party or the public relies on about its vulnerability management
and patch management programs that it fails to follow. Setting
126. Id. at 13,176.
127. FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 12 (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.
128. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
10 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_protetingpersonal-information.pdf.
129. Smith, supra note 114.
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these exceptions aside, in the wake of this ambivalent guidance, a
company needs to make decisions about what is reasonable, and
they may not be the same decisions the FTC would have made.
2.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office
for Civil Rights (HHS OCR)

Like the FTC, the HHS OCR has also demonstrated an interest
in investigating and bringing enforcement actions for vulnerability
management and patch management practices.130 HHS OCR enforces the implementing regulations under HIPAA and the
HITECH Act of 2009.131 The applicable regulations for information
security are the Privacy Rule132 and the Security Rule.133 Entities
subject to the regulations (“covered entities”) include certain
healthcare providers, health plans, and healthcare clearinghouses.134 Business associates of covered entities are also subject
to certain regulatory oversight by HHS OCR.135 This includes any
person or organization that performs services for a covered entity
that includes the use of or disclosure of protected health information (PHI).136
The Security Rule requires covered entities and business associates to protect electronic PHI (ePHI) and establishes minimum security requirements to do so.137 The Security Rule consists of
“standards” and “implementation specifications.” Some of the
standards are required, while others are considered “addressable.”
Although the Security Rule does not reference vulnerability management or patch management, covered entities and business associates are required under the rule to conduct a “risk analysis,” implement a “risk management” process, and ensure “transmission

130. See Resolution Agreement between HHS OCR and Anchorage Community Mental
Health Services, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.
hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/acmhs/amchs-capsettlement.pdf.
131. OCR, About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html; OCR, HITECH Act Rulemaking and Implementation Update, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (July 26, 2013),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/guidance/hitech-act-rulemakingimplementation-update/index.html.
132. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 (2013); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102164.106 (2013); 45 C.F.R.
§§ 164.302164.318 (2013).
133. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. ePHI is defined as protected health information that is transmitted by electronic
media or maintained in electronic media. Id.
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security.”138 This process likely will include evaluations of a company’s vulnerability and patch management.
A risk analysis is an accurate and thorough assessment of the
potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of ePHI a covered entity or business associate
holds.139 Under the Security Rule, the risk management process
implements security measures sufficient to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to a reasonable and appropriate level.140 According to
an HHS OCR newsletter from July 2018, a risk analysis includes
identifying risks and vulnerabilities that unpatched software poses
to an organization’s ePHI.141 In the July 2018 newsletter, HHS
OCR stated that implementing security measures can include “installing patches if patches are available and patching is reasonable
and appropriate.”142
Failures to adequately address vulnerabilities have also been explicitly cited in HHS OCR enforcement actions. In a settlement announced in 2014, HHS OCR stated that a covered entity suffered a
breach of unsecured ePHI due to the covered entity’s failure to regularly update its “IT resources with available patches.”143 The settlement agreement144 indicated that the failure to update IT resources with available patches was a violation of the transmission
security requirement of the Security Rule.145
As such, HHS OCR clearly considers vulnerability management
and patch management as important requirements for covered entities and business associates. However, the 2018 newsletter indicates that HHS OCR may take a potentially flexible approach to
evaluating patch management through an understanding that deployment of a patch may not be appropriate. In those cases, HHS
OCR likely expects that entities implement compensating controls

138.
139.
140.
141.

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)–(B); id. § 164.312(e)(1).
Id. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A).
Id. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B).
Guidance on Software Vulnerabilities and Patching, U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. OFF. FOR C.R. 1 (June 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/june-2018-newsletter-software-patches.pdf.
142. Id. at 2.
143. Bulletin: HIPAA Settlement Underscores the Vulnerability of Unpatched and Unsupported Software, U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. FOR C.R. 1 (Dec. 2014),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/acmhs/acmhsbulletin.pdf.
144. See Resolution Agreement, supra note 130.
145. The Security Rule requires “transmission security” which are “technical security
measures to guard against unauthorized access to [ePHI] that is being transmitted over an
electronic communications network.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(e)(1) (2013).
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to reduce the risk of identified vulnerabilities in the unpatched software.146
3.

The Securities and Exchange Commission

The SEC enforces a variety of different statutes and regulations,
including the Safeguards Rule of Regulation S-P, which requires
that brokers, dealers, investment companies, and registered investment advisors adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer records and information.147 In the cases
where the SEC has brought enforcement actions for violations of
the Safeguards Rule, the SEC has alleged the companies failed to
implement policies and procedures related to encrypting customer
PII or employing a firewall to protect web servers.148 It has not yet
alleged in an enforcement action that a failure to have written policies and procedures related to vulnerability management and
patch management were a violation of the Safeguards Rule.
However, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) has released several publications that highlight
vulnerability management and patch management. In May 2017,
following reports of widespread attacks by the malware WannaCry,
OCIE released a “risk alert” that, in an examination of seventy-five
registered broker-dealers, investment advisors, and investment
companies, all broker-dealers and ninety-six percent of investment
management firms had a regular process in place to install software
patches.149 However, the risk alert reported that a minority of the
inspected entities had a “significant number of critical and highrisk security patches that were missing important updates.”150 In
a 2020 report on “Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations,”
OCIE reported that inspected organizations used vulnerability
scanning to routinely scan systems within the organization and a
patch management program to patch software and hardware.151
OCIE reiterated the importance of patch management and vulnerability management as a way to “enhance cybersecurity

146. Resolution Agreement, supra note 130, at 1–2.
147. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a) (2005).
148. R.T. Jones Cap. Equities Mgmt., Inc., No. 3-16827 (S.E.C. Sept. 22, 2015).
149. Cybersecurity: Ransomware Alert, OFF. COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS
1–2 (May 17, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/risk-alert-cybersecurity-ransomware-alert.pdf.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Off. Compliance Inspections & Examinations, Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 4–5 (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIECybersecurity-and-Resiliency-Observations-2020-508.pdf.
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preparedness and operational resiliency” in a July 10, 2020 risk
alert.152 Specifically, the OCIE risk alert stated, “[i]mplementing
proactive vulnerability and patch management programs that take
into consideration current risks to the technology environment, and
that are conducted frequently and consistently across the technology environment.”153
These SEC publications indicate that the SEC may consider written policies and procedures for vulnerability management and
patch management to be a part of an information security program
that is “reasonably designed” to protect customer records and information and in compliance with the Safeguards Rule.
B.

State Statutes

Regulators and plaintiffs in private litigation have alleged poor
patch management and vulnerability management practices violate
certain state statutes. All fifty states, the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted data breach
notification laws. In addition to breach notification, half of the
states have enacted laws that require certain data security practices. The enforcement mechanism for these laws vary and include
private rights of action or enforcement by state regulators. California was the first state to enact both a data breach notification law
and a data security practices law. Enacted in 2004, the California
data security practices law requires businesses that own or license
information about California residents to “implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices . . . to protect the personal information . . . .”154 The law provides a private right of action
by an injured party.155 Many other states have since joined California in requiring reasonable information security. Regulators take
the view, as expressed in statements implementing regulations,
that these reasonable security practices include patching outdated
software.
In a 2016 report, the California Attorney General identified the
Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls as the minimum level of information security that organizations must meet to
have reasonable security.156 As explained in Section II, CIS Control
3 requires vulnerability management and patch management. In
152. Cybersecurity: Ransomware Alert, OFF. COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS
2 (July 10, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/Risk%20Alert%20-%20Ransomware.pdf.
153. Id. at 3.
154. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b).
155. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b).
156. HARRIS, supra note 67, at 30.
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the “Message from the Attorney General,” then-Attorney General
Kamala Harris specifically cited that for the breaches from 2012 to
2015 in California, “nearly all of the exploited vulnerabilities, which
enabled these breaches, were compromised more than a year after
the solution to patch the vulnerability was publicly available.”157
Like California, Oregon requires businesses “develop, implement
and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of personal information . . . .”158 The Oregon
law also provides examples of reasonable safeguards for companies
to use, including “[a]pplying security updates and a reasonable security patch management program to software that might reasonably be at risk of or vulnerable to a breach of security.”159 Massachusetts has a similar requirement in the regulations implementing its
data security practices law. Under the regulation, businesses that
have systems connected to the internet and containing personal information must have “reasonably up-to-date firewall protection and
operating system security patches.”160
Recently, New York has joined the group of states that requires
data security practices. Beginning in March 2020, New York’s Stop
Hacks and Improve Electronic Data Security (SHIELD) Act went
into effect. The new law imposes a variety of new information security requirements on companies, including requiring businesses
that own or license New York residents’ private information “develop, implement and maintain reasonable safeguards to protect
the security, confidentiality and integrity of the private information
. . . .”161 The law identifies examples of safeguards for companies to
adopt to comply with the reasonable security requirement. Included within these safeguards are identifying reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks, assessing risks in network and
software design, and regularly testing and monitoring the effectiveness of key controls, systems, and procedures.
C.

Common Law Causes of Action

When an attacker successfully breaches a company network and
acquires (or in very few states, accesses) PII, state laws may require
the company to notify the individuals whose PII has been impacted
in certain circumstances. Following the notifications, impacted individuals often file class action lawsuits against the company. The
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at ii.
OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622(1).
Id. § 646A.622(2)(d)(B)(ii).
201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.04(6).
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-bb(2).
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alleged causes of action are varied and can include negligence, negligence per se, gross negligence, and unjust enrichment. Issues related to vulnerability and patch management are emerging as relevant bases for these causes of action.
1.

Negligence

In data breach cases, plaintiffs frequently, and often unsuccessfully, allege negligence under a common law tort theory. A claim of
negligence requires that a plaintiff allege four elements: duty,
breach, causation, and damages.162 The availability of plaintiffs to
successfully allege negligence as a cause of action following a data
breach is a contested legal issue. In several jurisdictions, courts
have ruled in favor of defendants and have dismissed negligence
claims in this context for a variety of reasons.163 In states where
negligence has been an available cause of action in this context,
plaintiffs may attempt to allege that a defendant’s patch management and vulnerability management procedures are relevant to determining whether the defendant satisfied its duty to use reasonable care to safeguard sensitive personal information. While duty is
a question of law, standard of care is a question of fact, established
through expert opinion,164 legislation, regulation, or fixed by the
factfinder by applying the facts of the case.165
In this context, courts typically have not specified the standard
of care required by a defendant, including whether that standard of
care requires adequate vulnerability management and patch management. Some courts have referred to the standard in vague
162. A general rule of negligence is that “anyone who does an affirmative act is under a
duty to others to exercise the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them arising out of the act.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1965).
163. On a variety of different bases, courts have dismissed data breach cases that allege
negligence. See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 977 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (dismissing claims brought under Indiana law for negligence because Indiana law
does not provide for a private cause of action for a database owner that fails to adequately
protection personal information); In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 477 (D. Md. 2020) (dismissing claims brought under Illinois law for
negligence because there is no duty under Illinois law to protect personal information); In re
Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1176 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing
claims under Alaska, California, Illinois, Iowa, and Massachusetts law due to the economic
loss rule).
164. In medical malpractice cases, determining standard of care “requires expert testimony and presents a question of fact for the jury.” K.H. ex rel. H.S. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d 1080,
1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (AM. L. INST. 1965); see also Sackin v.
TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (explaining that while
duty is a legal question, the scope of the duty is a question of foreseeability).
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“reasonableness” terms.166 Others have provided more specific references to whether the company used industry standards,167
whether the company followed its own written policies,168 and
whether the company was aware of the vulnerability that led to the
breach.169 These three characteristics may be relevant in a case
where the plaintiffs allege that a defendant failed to patch a known
software vulnerability.
a.

Cases Referencing Industry Standards

In the privacy class action filed against Target following the
cyberattack that affected more than forty-one-million customer
payment card accounts, the plaintiffs claimed Target failed to comply with PCI-DSS.170 The plaintiffs also claimed Target owed a duty
“to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, retaining, securing, safeguarding, deleting and protecting [Plaintiffs’] personal and financial information in its possession from being compromised, lost, stolen, accessed and misused by unauthorized persons.”171 Target did
not dispute this element, and some of the negligence claims alleging
a failure to comply with PCI-DSS survived Target’s motion to dismiss. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Sackin v. TransPerfect Global, Inc.
166. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (noting that plaintiffs claimed defendants owed a duty “to exercise reasonable care in obtaining, retaining,
securing, safeguarding, deleting and protecting [Plaintiffs’] personal and financial information in its possession from being compromised, lost, stolen, accessed and misused by unauthorized persons”) (alteration in original); see also Hapka v. Carecentrix, Inc., No. 16-2372CM, 2016 WL 7336407, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 2016) (explaining that plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that employer defendants breached their duty to implement reasonable data security
measures in “obtaining, securing, safeguarding, deleting and protecting” plaintiffs’ personal
information from disclosure).
167. Sackin, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 744 (“TransPerfect’s cyber-security was not up to industry
par . . . .”); Wines, Vines & Corks, LLC v. First Nat’l of Neb., Inc., No. 8:14CV82, 2014 WL
12665802, at *5 (D. Neb. Aug. 20, 2014) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim that defendants failed
to use “reasonable care and conform to industry standards in securing and protect[ing]”
plaintiff’s account information survived a motion to dismiss).
168. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL
288483, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment
in part because defendant followed its own information security policies).
169. Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 3:17-cv-30111-TSH, 2019 WL 7946103, at *13 (D.
Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (“Because Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to employ reasonable
security measures, including encryption, which was recommended by the Information Technology Department after two previous data breaches and to adequately train its employees
to guard against a phishing scam, the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants
breached their duty of reasonable care.”); see also Bohannan v. Innovak Int’l, Inc., 318 F.R.D.
525, 527 (M.D. Ala. 2016).
170. Amended Complaint at 121, In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp.
3d 1154, 1170 (D. Minn. 2014) (No. 14-2522). Notably, PCI-DSS standards require that companies maintain a vulnerability management program. See infra Part III.C.
171. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (alteration in original).

Summer 2021

Patch Management

299

alleged that because TransPerfect’s cybersecurity was “not up to industry par,” an employee responded to a phishing email and sent
copies of W-2 forms and payroll information for all current and former employees to a cybercriminal.172 The court found that plaintiffs
sufficiently alleged “TransPerfect violated its duty to take reasonable steps to protect its employees’ PII.”173 Specifically, TransPerfect’s cybersecurity was “not up to industry par” because it failed to
erect a digital firewall, conduct data security training, or adopt retention and destruction policies.174 The accepted reliance on industry standards indicates that the industry standards set forth in Section II relating to vulnerability and patch management may be considered in determining the duty of care.
b.

Cases Referencing Internal Policies

Courts have found that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a
breach of duty of reasonable care when plaintiffs have alleged that
defendants failed to comply with their own policies.175 In 2015, a
trial court in New York concluded that following a breach of health
information, the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a negligence claim because the hospital’s privacy policy assured the plaintiffs that the
hospital would protect the plaintiffs’ information and would not disclose it without consent.176 Conversely, courts have held that defendants acted reasonably when defendants implemented written
information security policies.177 As such, when companies have internal policies relating to vulnerability and patch management, a
failure to comply with those policies may also provide a basis for a
plaintiff to allege a duty of care existed.

172. Sackin v. TransPerfect Glob., Inc., 278 F. Supp. 3d 739, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
173. Id. at 748.
174. Id. at 744, 748.
175. Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 3:17-cv-30111-TSH, 2019 WL 7946103, at *13 (D.
Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (“Because Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to employ reasonable
security measures, including encryption, which was recommended by the Information Technology Department after two previous data breaches and to adequately train its employees
to guard against a phishing scam, the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants
breached their duty of reasonable care.”); Abdale v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Sys.,
Inc., 19 N.Y.S.3d 850, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (finding plaintiffs’ negligence claim survived
a motion to dismiss, the court did not analyze the standard of care and noted defendants
allegedly informed plaintiffs their personal information would not be shared with third parties absent consent).
176. Abdale, 19 N.Y.S.3d at 861.
177. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL
288483, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment
in part because defendant followed its own information security policies).
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Cases Referencing Knowledge

In 2016, Innovak, a creator of administrative software for school
districts, announced users’ PII had been comprised in a data breach
when hackers infiltrated the internet portal where end users accessed their tax and payroll information.178 In the privacy class action litigation that followed, the plaintiffs claimed that Innovak
knew of the vulnerability since 2014 and “failed to take reasonable
steps to prevent a breach.”179 Though neither the court nor the
plaintiffs articulated a standard of care, Innovak’s alleged awareness of its vulnerabilities and its failure to take affirmative steps
led the court to deny Innovak’s motion to dismiss.180
Although the ability for a plaintiff to allege negligence following
a data breach is an undecided issue of law, to reduce the legal risk
of a cause of action for negligence, these considerations weigh in
favor of a company maintaining and implementing an adequate vulnerability management and patch management program, which includes following the written procedures that apply to the program
and staying abreast of industry standards.
2.

Negligence Per Se

In the context of data breach litigation, plaintiffs have similarly
attempted, with mixed results, to use Section 5 of the FTCA and the
failure to use “reasonable measures” to protect personal information as the basis for a claim of negligence per se.181 In states
where courts have held that negligence per se applies, plaintiffs
have sought to establish a duty through FTC publications and orders related to vulnerability and patch management.
In 2019, an attack on Capital One affected over 100 million consumers in the United States.182 The plaintiffs alleged that hackers
accessed their data by exploiting a “well-known” vulnerability of the
Amazon Web Services cloud where Capital One stored consumers’
confidential PII.183 The court found that the plaintiffs plausibly
178. Bohannan v. Innovak Int’l, Inc., 318 F.R.D. 525, 527 (M.D. Ala. 2016).
179. Id. at 530.
180. Id.
181. See In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 19-md-2879, 2020
WL 6290670, at *21 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2020) (dismissing negligence per se claims brought under Maryland law but denying defendant’s motion to dismiss negligence per se claims
brought under Connecticut and Georgia law); In re Capital One Consumer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., No. 1:19md2915 (AJT/JFA), 2020 WL 5629790, at *18 (E.D. Va. Sept. 18, 2020) (dismissing negligence per se claims brought under Virginia law but denying defendant’s motion
to dismiss negligence per se claims brought under New York law).
182. In re Capital One Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2020 WL 5629790, at *1.
183. Id.
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alleged a negligence per se claim under New York law, because the
plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the FTCA created an enforceable
duty in the data breach context and the plaintiffs were of the class
the statute was meant to protect—those whose information was allegedly compromised by a data breach.184 Further, the plaintiffs
imported the standard of care from the FTCA, which, as stated earlier, included provisions related to vulnerability and patch management.185
Marriott announced in 2018 that hackers had infiltrated its guest
reservation database and had been extricating customers’ PII for
four years.186 Plaintiffs sufficiently pled negligence per se predicated on violations of Section 5 of the FTCA under Connecticut law
and Georgia law, but not under Maryland law.187 In its opinion, the
court rejected defendants’ argument that the “FTC Act cannot serve
as the predicate for a negligence claim based on the violation of a
statute because it does not ‘proscribe a particular standard of
care.’”188 The court explained that several courts had rejected similar arguments by “finding that data breach plaintiffs adequately
had pleaded claims of negligence per se based on alleged violations
of Section 5 of the FTC [A]ct.”189 Because a violation of Section 5 of
the FTCA can serve as a predicate for a negligence per se claim, the
vulnerability management and patch management considerations
within that Act may be considered as part of the risk of civil liability
in a class action.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though adequate cybersecurity is in many ways viewed as a subjective metric that can be based on factors specific to a company’s
size, industry, and risk profile, objective measures applicable to
general categories of security functions continue to come into focus.
Developing caselaw and language relating to regulatory enforcement are making it apparent that vulnerability and patch management are widely becoming recognized as essential functions of an
adequate cybersecurity program. Thus, vulnerability and patch
184. Id.
185. Id. The court found defendants’ alleged violations of Section 5 of the FTC did not
predicate a negligence per se claim under Virginia law, because only statutes “enacted for
public safety” may give rise to negligence per se claims. Id. at *18.
186. In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 19-md-2879, 2020
WL 6290670, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2020).
187. Id. at *24. The court dismissed the negligence per se action under Maryland law
because it does not recognize an independent cause of action. Id. at *21.
188. Id. at *10.
189. Id.
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management are no longer purely technical functions which concern only a company’s IT department, because their existence and
sufficiency within a company’s cybersecurity program have likewise
become the subject of scrutiny of regulators and plaintiffs alike. As
such, legal departments are increasingly having to take notice of
their company’s vulnerability management and patch management
programs and evaluate the potential legal risk they pose to the company, even before a data breach occurs.

